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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The Petitioner-Appellant, Edwin Papse,
appeals from a judgment of the District Court
of Box Elder County, dismissing Appellant's.
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

-2DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Petitioner-Appellant and one George
Jackson filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the District Court of Box Elder
county, in May of 1967. The Petition was
set for hearing and a hearing was held in
October of that year before the Honorable
Lewis Jones. At that hearing, testimony
was taken and an Order issued therefrom.
The Order released George Jackson, but returned
Edwin Papse to the State Prison to await retrial, action by the Board of Pardons, or,
finally, disposition by that Court.
In December
of 1967, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and an Order denying Habeas Corpus were
issued.
The Order denied the relief ~ought
by the Pe ti ti on.
Petitioner filed again in December of

1967, the Petition being denied the same day.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits that the Judgment
of the Trial Court should be reversed and his
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus should
be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner is an indigent Indian.
left school in the eighth grade, having
attended a Blackfoot Indian school.

He

On July 22, 1966, Petitioner and one
George Jackson were arrested and charged with
rape.
From that time until the 9th of August,
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l

Petitioner and Jackson remained in the Box
Elder County Jail.
On the 9th of August,
counsel was appointed, Petitioner and Jackson
. were arraigned, plead gui 1 ty, and were sentencei
:;: to the Utah State Prison --- all within a periol
-~ of less than three hours!
~
In May of 1967, Petitioner and George
Jackson jointly petitioned the Court, in the
same Petition, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in
the First District Court. A hearing was then
held.
The Writ was granted as to George
Jackson, and he was released.
Petitioner's
disposition was held under advisement, and ~
was returned to the State Prison to await trial,
action by the Board of Pardons, or dispositioo
of the Writ.
In December, that Court issued
an Order denying Habeas Corpus relief to the
Petitioner.
Petitioner applied to that Court
again, individually, for a Writ, but was agah
denied because all the issues had been heard
in the first case.
Petitioner now appeals
from the denial of both Petitions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NEITHER THE RECORD OF THE HABEAS
CORPUS HEARING NOR THE RECORD OF
THE ORIGINAL ARRAIGNMENT SUPPORT
A FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS
INFORMED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF
PLEADING GUILTY, AND THUS ENTERED
A VOLUNTARY-INFORMED PLEA OF
GUILTY.
"Where the Defendant is not
represented by counsel the Court
shall not accept a plea of guilty
until it shall have explained to

I

-4Defendant the consequences."
77-24-6, Utah Code Anno. (1953)
Where a Defendant is not made aware of the consequences of pleading guilty, the Court has
reversed the sentence. See State v. Banford,
13 Utah 2d 63, 368 P. 2d 473 (1962). This
statute places the duty of 'affirmative
.
advisement' on the court in absence of counsel.
In the presence of counsel, the statute at
lease infers a corresponding duty om counsel
to so advise the Defendant.
This 'affirmative advisement• is prerequisite to the entry of an informed voluntary
plea of guilty; it is elemental due process
that a plea of guilty must be informed and
voluntary. Wood v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 601,
414 P. 2d 601.
In the case at bar, the record clearly
indicates that the Court did not advise
Defendants of the consequences. The same
record indicates that counsel was appointed
by the Court, that counsel conferred with the
Defendants less than three hours before the
plea was entered and sentence pronounced, and
that counsel spent less than one hour with
Defendants before pleading. Because of the
near illiteracy, as evidenced by his testimony
in the Habeas Corpus hearing, of the Defendant
Papse and the time limitations imposed on
counsel, the trial court itself felt a "little
doubtful whether Attorney Holt explained to
the Defendants so they could understand • • • "
The Court released George Jackson because of
its feelings about the inadequacy of advisement.

-5-

1

of advisement.
The record does not indicate
Petitioner was informed by court or counsel
of the consequences of pleading guilty, the
record and the Order indicating some grounds
for concern.

The record of the Habeas Corpus heari~
indicates how easily led Petitioner is. The i
same record demonstrates a need for inforrni~ I
Pe ti ti oner.
Petitioner answered the Assistant I
Attorney General's question with a "yeah" wheni
1
he did not even understand the words the
1
Assistant Attorney General was using. (R. 37-3!
In several state courts, irrespective
of counsel, the trial court is required to
make an affirmative finding of record that
the Defendant is fully advised of the consequences of pleading guilty and of the voluntari 1
nature ther.eof.
See State ex rel Burnett v.
Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 126 NW2d 91 (1964);
McCoy v. State, 169 Tex. Crm. 620, 336 SW2d
945 (1960); Illinois Supreme Court Rule 26;
Rule 70 (b), Manuals for Courts Martial, 1951.
This court may have already given tacit
approval of such a requirement.
The cases
cited in State v. Banford, supra, hold that
compliance with the statutory requirement of
affirmative advisement of the consequences
of a plea of guilty must affirmatively appeu
from the record.
See Krolage v. People, 224
Ill. 456, 79 NE 570 (1906) (as cited in~
v. Banford, supra), a case in which the
Petitioner was represented by counsel.

l

POINT II.
THE ACCEPTANCE OF A PLEA OF GUILTY
WITHOUT INQUIRY INTO ITS INFORMEDVOLUNTARY CHARACTER IS PREJUDICIAL
ERROR.

r

-6-

At the time of entry of a plea, the
court may in its discretion refuse to accept
the plea (77-24-7, Utah Code Anno. [1953]).

At the time of the entry, a plea may
he predicated upon a substantial misunderng standing.
It should logically follow that a
i plea based on a misunderstanding cannot be
1
an informed-voluntary plea.
It cannot be
~t I said that en try and acceptance of an uninf orrned
en plea is not prejudicial, since such a plea may
not have been made had a misunderstanding not
-3! existed.
(State v. Ban ford, supra) ·

I

I

An accused should not be allowed to
plead guilty if there is mistake inducing
his judicial confession. U.S. v. Ha!lli.11, 8
I USCMA 464, 24 CMR 274 (1957).
Without an
aril inquiry at the time of the acceptance of a
plea, confusion would never be revealed.
Without a record of inquiry, the confusion
of an accused may only be proven by ~is own
testimony at a subsequent hearing ...

.r

.e

The testimony of this Petitioner at
the Habeas Corpus hearing indicates bow
confused Pe ti ti oner can be. The record shows
that he answered the same or similar questions
totally inconsistently (R. 32-37, awareness of
consequences of pleading guilty).
(Ti.. 37-38
voluntary)
The Petitioner is obviously e.asily
confused.
The lack of time with comsel, lack
cf advisement by the court, and his belief in
representations, well-founded or not, of . _.
Sheriff Hyde, added to the confusiom. of the
Petitioner.

-7POINT III.
THE FACT OF "A TERM IN THE IDAHO
STATE PRISON" PREVIOUS TO THIS
OFFENSE IS NOT SUFFICIENT BASIS
TO DENY HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF,
NOR GROUNDS TO INFER KNOWLEDGE
OF THE CONSEQUENCES AND CORRESPOIDING INFORMED-VOLUNTARY ENTRY
OF A PLEA OF GUILTY.
The findings of the Court denying relief
recite that the Petitioner has served a term
in Idaho, along with the other grounds challeng
in Point I, as the Court's reason for denying
relief. Under the same Petition, on the same
hearing, and from the same facts, the trial
court released co-Defendant George Jackson.
There are, therefore, grounds sufficient to
award relief in this case but for the fact of
the Idaho term in that Court's opinion.
Petitioner's Idaho term was from a plea
of guilty, the plea was without the assistance
of counsel, and the plea was to a burglary
charge. It has no resemblance, and thus
provides no grounds for inference of knowledge
of one's rights under Utah procedure, unlike
Workman v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d, 425 P. 2d 402
(1967), where the Court allowed an inference
in waivin9' the right to counsel. Workman had
served the term in the Utah State Prison for
the same offense, having testified that he
knew his rights (as a matter of record), and
had had counsel at the earlier hearing.

l

-8The Idaho term has no reasonable
relationship or logical relevance to the lack
of affirmative advisement and corresponding
entry of an uninformed plea by this Petitioner,
since it does not relate to the same charge,
same procedure, and he was without counsel at
that time.
CONCLUSION
There is a sufficient lack of evidence
within the record to indicate that Petitioner
was uninformed of the consequences of pleading
guilty and that adequate steps were not taken
to protect his rights.
Though the burden is
upon the moving party to establish his cause
for relief by clear evidence, the lack of any
evidence and misgivings of those involved
establish Petitioner's case that he was uninformed or at least confused when he entered
his plea.
.
Appellant respectfully submits that the
trial court erred in denying Petitioner's
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
trial court's Order should be reversed and the
Petition granted.
Respectfully submitted,

F. ROBERT REEDER
Attorney for Petitione~,.·
Appellant
.
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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